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Abstract In this paper, I consider J. L. Austin’s William James Lectures ‘How to do 
Things with Words’, in order to ask to what extent Austin’s notion of the speech act 
might also be applicable to music. Are there ‘music-acts’, and what would such a 
possibility tell us about music and its evolution, its relationship to language, and its 
social functions? 
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0.    Introduction 
In the abstract for the first of his William James Lectures at Harvard University in 1955, 
J. L. Austin sets out what is surely a provocative premise when he begins: «Many 
“statements” were shown to be, as Kant perhaps first argued systematically, strictly 
nonsense, despite an unexceptionable grammatical form». This observation, oddly and 
of course unintentionally, seems to me to place language and music in the same bracket. 
It is important to my discussion to consider this parallel, since it is not perhaps so 
obvious that music and language are «in the same bracket». Indeed, Peter Kivy (2007) 
notes that when he was invited to speak at a colloquium entitled Music, Language and 
Cognition, his first response was to be «reminded of the game in which a child is shown, 
for example, pictures of an apple, a banana, and a trumpet, and asked “Which one 
doesn’t belong?”». For Kivy, the odd one out is Language, whose relation to music he 
regards as merely confusing. This is because Kivy is participant in a long-standing 
debate about how and what music means. One of the key figures in this debate is the 
Viennese music critic Eduard Hanslick, who in his book Vom Musikalisch-Schönen: Ein 
Beitrag zur Revision der Ästhetik der Tonkunst [On the Musically Beautiful: A Contribution 
Towards the Revision of the Aesthetics of Music] (1854) already separates out music 
and language as follows: 
 
while sound in speech is but a sign, that is, a means for the purpose of expressing 
something which is quite distinct from its medium, sound in music is the end, that 
is the ultimate and absolute object in view (Hanslick 1854: 67). 
 
Austin’s argument, however, provides what seems to me an interesting point of contact 
between the two. Austin is trying to show that language does something more than what 





we might think it does; which is «to state some fact»: to provide us with a complete, 
coherent and pinned-down meaning within the logical structures of words and syntax. 
When Steven Pinker (1997) – to take only the most extreme and notorious example – 
describes music as «auditory cheesecake», he is perhaps making a similar observation 
that, despite its obvious, delineated materials and structuring processes - arguably in 
their own way as ‘grammatical’ as Austin’s statements - music also is «strictly nonsense»; 
that is, it also has no complete and coherent meaning that we can identify logically, 
especially in words. 
Pinker writes: 
 
Compared with language, vision, social reasoning, and physical know-how, music 
could vanish from our species and the rest of our lifestyle would be virtually 
unchanged. Music appears to be a pure pleasure technology (Pinker 1997: 528)1. 
 
This is a different challenge to that posed by Hanslick, concerned not with what it is 
about music that has meaning for us, but rather with the way in which music’s meaning 
impacts on what it is to be a living being. However, these two challenges also seem to 
me to be related by Austin’s observation.  Austin’s point is that language, to be as 
central as it is to human culture, must be doing something else besides stating. Similarly, 
some of our difficulties in thinking about music may stem from the fact that it also is 
doing something other than what we think it is doing. Perhaps, in both cases, the 
something more is effecting an action? 
 
 
1.    Social Configurations 
What I want to consider here is to what extent Austin’s notion of the speech act might 
also be applicable to music. Are there ‘music-acts’, and what would such a possibility tell 
us about music, its evolution, its relationship to language, and its social functions? The 
resistance music has to explicit meaning - its quality of ‘ineffability’ - is one of the 
properties that makes its possible relationship to language puzzling. Austin’s argument, 
of course, is that language is not an end in itself, but rather a medium through which 
many kinds of actions are performed. This fits, for example, with Michael Arbib’s view, 
in the Introduction to his recent book Language, Music and the Brain (Arbib 2013), that 
neither language nor music are simply patterns of sound, but must be considered in 
terms of the action-perception strategies of a living organism. Now, Austin’s ‘actions’ 
and Arbib’s ‘action and perception’, while related, are not quite the same thing. The 
action-perception strategies of an organism are individual to that organism and psycho-
biologically internalised, while Austin is looking outwards from the organism to notice 
the effects words have in the socially determined contexts within which they are uttered. 
At the same time, each of these action-perception modes co-evolves with a context or 
environment that provides what are often referred to as ‘affordances’: relational 
properties that exist as «the information for perception, with two kinds always available, 
one about the environment and another about the self» (Gibson 2015: 228).  
In Doing things with music (Krueger 2010), Joel Krueger considers the notion of ‘musical 
affordance’, a relational property that is « exploited to construct and regulate emotions » 
(Krueger 2010: 1). In this account, developed from both psychological and sociological 
perspectives (see Trevarthen 1999; DeNora 2000, 2013), music appears to have direct 
                                                             
1 Pinker is, of course, making a category error here in his comparions, by placing vision and reasoning 
against ‘music’ rather than against the auditory sense itself, but he goes on to remark that « music 
communicates nothing but formless emotion » (Ivi: 529), which is a more cogent expression of his view 
that music lacks « sense ». 





physiological and social effects on human listeners. Culturally specific in action, effects 
such as entrainment and mood regulation are regarded as being intrinsic to music, 
regardless of how ‘music’ comes to be identified. In this respect, music could be said to 
be effecting an action, following Hanslick (and Gurney), simply by the brute power of its 
sounding properties. DeNora’s earlier position (1986) presents music as a «place and 
space for "work"», where work refers to the construction of meaning within a « place 
and space » determined by social forces. DeNora uses Austin’s theory to support the 
consideration of music « in use » (Ivi: 88), and her commitment to social construction 
focuses on the contestation of the meaning of an utterance: 
 
culture represents a struggle over the definition of social reality and therefore, the 
issue of the meaning of objects is also an issue of who defines or appropriates them, 
where, when, how, and for what purpose (Ivi: 93). 
 
In DeNora’s account, the work is done not so much by the music as by the listener: 
 
Thus a sociology of musical meaning is also a sociology of the styles or modes of 
work done by the listener and as such it should ask questions about how much work 
the music requires of the listener (Ivi: 92). 
 
This, listener-centred discussion is a welcome counter to music-centred hermeneutics, 
but it does not yet approach a consideration of how music acts might operate. As 
Andrew Chung points out, in his detailed application of speech act theory to music:  
 
musical utterances perform actions beyond the level of intramusical mapping and 
extramusical reference, on the one hand, and its affective, psychological, motoric 




1.1    Austin’s Conditions for Actions 
Since we have raised the topic of the social, I want briefly to consider the social 
configuration of the actors involved in Austin’s speech acts, and how these might relate 
to music. In Austin’s first examples, it is clear that various individuals and social 
groupings are being addressed directly. In the ceremony of marriage, for instance, the 
statement «I do (take this man to be my lawful wedded husband)» is addressed, multiply, 
to the celebrant of the marriage, to the husband, to any social onlookers, and 
importantly to the body of legal statutes that enshrines the requirements and entailments 
of marriage itself. As Austin says, «it seems clear that to utter the sentence (in, of course, 
the appropriate circumstances) is not to describe my doing of what I should be said in 
so uttering to be doing or to state that I am doing it: it is to do it» (Austin 1955: I, 4). 
This action, of course, only works in «the appropriate circumstances», which include the 
various people being addressed knowing that they are being addressed. The act is 
accomplished through the social changes it effects through agreed conventions. Austin 
calls the circumstances within which a speech act operates its felicity conditions. This 
emphasises a key aspect of speech acts, that they do not conform to the binary of 
true/false, but rather are evaluated in terms of whether they turn out well or badly. This 
connects sensibly with music, where ‘truth’ is not an issue, but whether the thing 
happens well or effectively clearly is. Austin’s felicity conditions include agreed-upon 
conventions, but also the authority an actor holds within those conventions: only certain 
people are able to pronounce a marriage, in Austin’s example. It is clear that music only 





music typically exists within sets of conventions, agreed or contested specifically within 
particular social and cultural contexts. Similarly, music performances include regimes of 
specific authority: there are circumstances in which it is acceptable for a listener to join 
in the performance, and circumstances where it is not (or consider the late recordings of 
Glenn Gould, where the performer’s own vocal interventions in works nominally for 
the piano are deemed eccentric by many). But this is just to say that Austin’s felicity 
conditions can seem appropriate to music, and more importantly that they set up and 
make evident critical relationships across the actors involved in all aspects of an 
utterance.  
Austin distinguishes between speech itself, locution, speech acts whose outcome is an 
inevitable consequence of the speech, illocution, and those whose outcome is only a 
potential, perlocution. Thus he says, «we may entirely clear up whether someone was 
arguing or not without touching on the question whether he was convincing anyone or 
not»  (Austin 1955: VIII, 104). In terms of ‘music acts’, we should consider whether 
music might be capable of perlocutionary registers - having «consquential effects» 
(Austin 1955: VIII, 102). Austin sets out the types of illocutionary forces that he finds in 
speech acts, and it is worth considering those in relation to the possible effects of music. 
Austin’s list includes: verdictives – giving a verdict; exercitives – exercising rights and 
powers; commissives – committing or promising; behabitives – instantiating an attitude or 
feeling; and expositives – establishing relational connections. Justin London (1996) asserts 
a metaphorical relationship between language and music in order to explore a parallel 
between Austin’s speech act theory and the presence of meaningful structures in 
European tonal music. His terms tonary, intonary and pertonary map Austin’s linguistic 
definitions onto the progressions of common practice tonality, their meanings and 
effects. Thus an extended cadential progression, through a cadential dominant to a final 
tonic, functions as a harmonic progression (tonary), a signification of closure by 
common convention (intonary), and a possible affect of ending (pertonary). London 
also limits his parallel to Austin’s behabitives, since «behabitives are speech acts which are 
strongly marked by intonation as well as other paralinguistic features» (London 1996: 
57) and thus already inhabit a sort of para-musical world within speech.  
While London’s argument is detailed and convincing, particularly with respect to the 
Haydn string quartet he takes as his example, he is at pains to emphasise the 
metaphorical nature of the music/language correspondence. It is not just that, as he 
admits, he is «at a loss to say what Haydn means» (London 1996: 61), but that the mode 
of listening implied depends on a particular view of the relationship between utterer and 
listener that is quite specific to language. Whatever action I may intend by an utterance, 
it does not happen while I am talking to myself; language always seems to imply that 
someone is being addressed, as Austin says «in [...] the appropriate circumstances», in 
order for an act to occur. The speaker, the addressee, and the situation are critically 
related, but it is worth considering in what ways. 
 
 
2.    The Ineffable 
Vladimir Jankélévitch begins his book Music and the Ineffable (1961) by considering how 
music acts on people: in his very first sentence, he asserts «La musique agit sur l’homme 
… / Music acts on a person». This action, from the first, operates in a manner that is 
strikingly different to what I have just described for language. In the first place, in 
Jankélévitch’s account, it is the music, and not the person who makes it, who is 
performing the action. When Jankélévitch says «Music acts …» (my reversal of the 
emphasis) he is setting up a different social configuration, which he describes as follows: 
 





One doesn’t ‘listen to’ a pianist who plays before an audience or to a singer who 
sings before that same audience in the same way that one ‘listens to’ a lecturer 
speaking to his hearers: for the listener is the second person, the ‘you’ of invocation 
or allocution, for the lecturer who is looking back at them, whereas the listener is 
the third person for the pianist sitting at the piano2 (Jankélévitch 1961: 32, author’s 
translation). 
 
This proposes the listener almost as voyeur, involved in the music but only indirectly. 
The music is not addressed to them, but appears as a component of a sort of network 
within which matters of agency and address figure as oblique strategies. You could 
perhaps reflect that when someone is speaking to you, it is very disconcerting if they 
avoid your gaze while they are speaking: this is usually interpreted as casting some sort 
of doubt on the nature of the utterance. On the contrary, it would be equally 
disconcerting if a pianist fixed you in an interlocutory gaze while performing a piece of  
music. (I have seen this happen, on television, and it is a curious experience.)   
The point here is not to drive a wedge between music and language over matters of 
agency. In both of these types of utterances, agency gets constructed in diverse and 
subtle ways, which reveal and instantiate relationships across the networks or 
assemblages through which the utterances function. Jankélévitch is nevertheless making 
a striking comment about the mode of address of music. While his example projects a 
particular image of music-making, as something that takes place within the 
contemplative aura of a European concert room, in front of an audience whose listening 
became «quieter, more considerate, and more attentive» (Goehr 1992: 237) as the 
project of Enlightenment ‘civilisation’ proceeded, the observation that listening to a 
pianist is not the same activity as listening to a lecturer is intriguing. If both are engaged 
in specifically performative activity, where does the difference lie? 
 
 
2.1  Modes of Address 
Jankélévitch is committed to a particular view of performativity that draws on the 
philosophy of Henri Bergson, and which regards each moment as being the contingent 
actualisation of specific virtual potentials. As Gilles Deleuze describes it, «in order to be 
actualized, the virtual cannot proceed by elimination or limitation but must create its 
own lines of actualization in positive acts» (Deleuze 1966: 97) Thus Jankélévitch exhorts 
us: 
 
 Music [...] is not made to be talked about, it is made to be done; it is not made to 
be spoken, but to be “played” [...] Is this not also the definition of the good. The 
good is made to be done, not just to be said or known [...]. The good is the 
business of militants!3 (Jankélévitch 1961: 93, author’s translation) 
 
This is a sort of radical, creative action that fits with Austin’s view of speech acts, and 
which proposes music not as the re-presentation of the ‘already-spoken’ (composed) but 
as the utterance of vital, present acts. What might these music acts be? 
                                                             
2 On n'« écoute » pas un pianiste qui joue devant son public ou un chanteur qui chante devant ce même 
public comme on « écoute » un conférencier qui parle à ses auditeurs: car l'auditeur est deuxième 
personne, personne d'invocation ou d'allocution, pour le conférencier qui le regarde, tandis qu'il est le 
troisième personne pour le pianiste assis à son piano. 
3 La musique [...] n'est pas faite pour qu'on on parle, elle est faite pour qu'on en fasse; elle n'est pas faite 
pour être dites, mais pour être « jouée » [...]. N'est-ce pas la définition même du bien? Le bien est fait pour 
être fait, non pas pour être dit ou connu [...]. Le bien est l'affaire des militantes! 





In order to get away from the sort of musical hermeneutics that lies behind London’s 
metaphoric use of speech acts, I will consider two types of music act that spring from 
two different relationships of addressing. First, a mode of address to a «“you”, the 
object of invocation or allocution» that appears clearly in Jankélévitch’s example. The 
pianist, «seated at the piano», is performing in the manner described by Nicolas Cook as 
an «irreducibly social phenomenon» (Cook 2012: 186), but to really get at the social one 
should consider the larger network or assemblage implied in the term «social». When 
Latour says «I believe it’s necessary to scrutinize more thoroughly the exact content of 
what is ‘assembled’ under the umbrella of a society» (Latour 2005: 2), he is wishing to 
include under this umbrella not just humans, but a heterogeneous collection of objects, 
practices, discourses, and other things that are, for him, inevitably in the social mix. 
Music performance is not speech; it has its own specific physical activities, energies, and 
modes of production, and what it produces might be characterised as energies positions 
these activities and energies in relation to an instrument: there is no music without an 
instrument (even where that instrument is a voice cf. Schaeffer 1971). The relationship 
between instrument and performer can be characterised as a social one: there must be 
communication between the two. The music acts of the performer are first acted in 
relation to the instrument. As in a speech act, the performative music acts of the pianist 
must invoke uptake on the part of the piano - there are ways in which it the piano will 
respond, and ways in which it will not. There are conventions that integrate the actions 
of the performer with the mechanism of the piano in ways that allow felicity conditions to 
operate, allowing the created sound, both in its immediacy and its flow to be, in Austin’s 
terms happy or unhappy, rather than true or false. From this perspective, playing an 
instrument is not at all the same as talking to oneself. It is a social production; an 
exchange between instrument and performer. In Jankélévitch’s description, the « 
conversation », in music as a form of discourse between performer and instrument, is 
indeed being « overheard » by the audience. This follows indications evident in a 
number of recent accounts of musical performance (see for example Östersjö 2008) that 
the notions of control and prosthesis that are often invoked when discussing musical 
instruments are not necessarily the most productive ones. Even the possibility of the 
agency of the instrument, raised by the notion of address, fits within a long tradition of 
writing about music. In Greek mythology concerning Apollo, for example, the satyr, 
Marsyas «stumbled upon the flute, which he had no sooner put to his lips than it played 
of itself, inspired by the memory of Athene’s music» (Graves 1955: 77). More recently, 
George Lewis discusses a conversation with Malachi Favors in which Favors remembers 
«this African brother who had instruments that played themselves» ( Lewis 1999: 99). 
The second mode of address to consider relates to the recipient of the sound. Both 
speech and music result in sound - their superficial point of commonality – and if, 
according to Jankélévitch, the listener in the concert room is an outsider to the 
utterance, there must also be an insider. Slavoj Žižek and Mladen Dolar touch on this 
matter in their book, Opera’s Second Death (2002) when they consider the notion of mercy 
in relation to music’s power to act. Dolar writes:  
 
music acts as an appeal to the Other, as the best means and the best strategy for 
attaining mercy, softening the Other’s heart, bending the Other’s resistence. […] 
Mercy is ambiguous […]: it is nothing but the positive, reverse side of another 
form of the Other, both more familiar and more terrifying - the Other’s whim and 
caprice (Žižek, Dolar 2002: 10, 23). 
 
This other is most often associated with the non-human, thus: 
 





Orpheus descends to the underworld to gain back his beloved Euridice, and he has 
only one tool, one instrument to achieve this goal: music. Music is what moves the 
deity to yield, music can defy death itself (Žižek, Dolar 2002: 8). 
 
This theme of music acts as effectors of transformation, in the utterer but in the 
presence of an addressee, is explored by Judith Marie Kubicki (1999) in her discussion 
of music in the sacred liturgy. She invokes the concepts of «existential induction», 
«institution» and «presentification», from the work of Jean Ladrière (1973) in order to 
present a view of music as a direct address to another in the form of an act of worship, 
with discernible consequences. 
  
What is accomplished in the singing is the speaking of attitudes which, because of its 
illocutionary power can, over time, bring about the transformation of those who 
participate in the liturgy, even as the participants perform the act of worshiping 
God (Ladrière 1973: 330). 
 
This act of transformation is echoed in A. L. Lloyd’s account of folk song, where he 
writes: 
 
Generally the folk song makers chose to express their longing by transposing the 
world on to an imaginative plane, not trying to escape from it, but colouring it with 
fantasy, turning bitter, even brutal facts of life into something beautiful, tragic, 
honourable, so that when singer and listeners return to reality at the end of the 
song, the environment is not changed but they are better fitted to grapple with it 
(Lloyd 1975: 170). 
 
Both of these accounts fit with Žižek and Dolar’s identification of music as an act of 
invocation or enchantment (incantare), what Jankélévitch refers to as Charme, in pursuit 
of the transformation of mercy. Mercy is neither perlocutionary nor a behabitive; it is 
achieved through an act, that is in Andrew Chung’s formulation «used to apply pressure 
to the world» (Chung 2018: 2.3.7) 
Jankélévitch is interesting in this discussion because he identifies the address mode of 
music as a symptom of what he sees as its difference from language. This is caught up in 
his philosophy of radical becoming, as a commitment to the drastic rather than the gnostic 
(cf. Abbate 2004), while also attending to the music’s details. In considering the notion 
of music acts, in relation to two modes of address indicated by Jankélévitch, the 
intention is not to use Austin’s insights metaphorically, but to consider whether music 
might have the same type of function as language i.e. doing something. This avoids 
discussions of meaning, as Austin does, and opens a line of investigation into the 
possible functions of music as an attribute of an organism. If Pinker’s critique is really as 
wrong-headed as it seems, it must still prompt us to consider what music does as an 
evolved potential for action rather than - or at least as well as - pleasure. In addition, for 
Jankélévitch it is the music rather than the performer who is deemed to be doing the 
acting, and while social conventions clearly bind social actors, could music - whatever 
that is - be a social actor in the same sense? 
 
 
3.   Origins of Music 
While I began by claiming that it is not perhaps so obvious that music and language are 
« in the same bracket », historical discussions of both language and music have made 
much of the possible evolutionary relationship between the two. Thus Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau in his Essay on the Origin of Languages (1781), and Herbert Spencer, in his essay 





The Origin and Function of Music (1857) attempt to entangle music and language in terms 
of what and how they express rather than the actions they achieve. Charles Darwin, on 
the other hand, in The Descent of Man (1871), is clear that music has the form of intended 
action. He writes: 
 
We shall see that primeval man, or rather some early progenitor of man, probably 
first used his voice in producing true musical cadences, that is in singing, as do 
some of the gibbon-apes at the present day; and we may conclude from a widely 
spread analogy, that this power would have been especially exerted during the 
courtship of the sexes – would have expressed various emotions, such as love, 





I conclude that musical notes and rhythm were first acquired by the male or female 
progenitors of mankind for the sake of charming the opposite sex (Darwin 1872: 
572). 
 
This would surely count as a sort of music-act and, like Jankélévitch, Darwin locates the 
power of music in its action rather than in any attribution of expression. He also uses 
the word «charm» to indicate the type of action involved, and, as we have seen above, to 
charm is to establish a set of relationships through the negotiation of authorities and 
consequent actions. It is a social endeavour, but one that critically extends the social 
beyond the confines of relations amongst a single type of being. It seeks to establish a 
power, not of authority but of creative potential. I take Darwin’s use of the word not as 
romantic cliché but at face value, as indicative of the creative action implied. As 
Jankélévitch writes:  
 
The work of charm [...] is not in saying but in doing (poiein), and music, in this way, 
resembles the poetic act. Make music, was what the dream said to Socrates, and 
never stop working; make music and work at it4 (Jankélévitch 1961: 91, author’s 
translation). 
 
The work of charm involves both illocution and perlocution.  When Austin says ‘I bet 
you …’ the words achieve their intended action simply by being uttered, whereas the 
charming of the opposite sex is not so simply accomplished! (Indeed, Darwin remarks 
that male birds sometimes die as a result of their singing exertions.) The illocutionary act 
is not just the establishment of a presence as a source of creative potential, but the 
offering of transformative relational associations. However, for Darwin, there is a music 
act, but only one. What other music acts could we imagine? 
 
 
3.1  Technologies 
Arnold Pacey begins his book Meaning in Technology with a chapter on music, not in the 
context of its productive technologies but as an active technology itself. Thus he 
remarks that: « Singing was just an ordinary hunting method. The Inuit used to make up 
lots of songs to make it easier to hunt animals» (Pacey 1999: 3) In a similar vein, Iain 
                                                             
4 L'oeuvre du charme [...] n'est pas un dire, mais un faire (ποιείν), et la musique, en cela, s'apparente à l'acte 
poétique. Fais de la musique, ordonne le songe à Socrate, et ne cesse pas d'œuvrer; μουσιχἠν ποἰει χαἰ 
ἐργάζου. 





Morley, in The Prehistory of Music (2013), starts with a concern for «the roles that musical 
behaviours might fulfil» (Morley 2013: 11), and he begins with what he considers to be 
recent evidence of the life-style of the ancient hunter-gathers. As an example, he quotes 
Kehoe’s (1999) account of the culture of the Blackfoot nation in the grasslands of 
North America, where a young man would sing «a spiritually potent song in the manner 
of a bleating calf» (Morley 2013: 16) in order to hunt buffalo. This, like Darwin’s 
account of music in the process of sexual selection, shows music in action. It also notes 
an additional property of music, shared by language, in its reference to mimesis: « in the 
manner of a bleating calf » This is clearly characterised as song - that is as music, rather 
than as mere animal imitation. But it is music that acts as a sort of charm. As Michael 
Taussig explains in Mimesis and Alterity (1993): «to give an example, to instantiate, to be 
concrete, are all examples of the magic of mimesis wherein the replication, the copy, 
acquires the power of the represented» (Taussing 1993: 13) The young man, through his 
imitation, sings something into being: something that slips between the human and the 
animal. Taussig is clear that: 
 
the spirits of plants and animals and so forth exist in human form! This slippage is 
essential, and I presume its specification for any particular plant, animal, object or 
person is its ‘secret’ (Ivi: 87). 
 
Thus the action of the song of the young man creates and potentialises a being that slips 
between two worlds, in an act as definite as Austin’s laying of a bet or contracting of a 
marriage. It makes something so, in a situation where the conventions in play include, 
but are more than, human ones. This might also speak to contemporary concerns to 
counter a normative, anthropocentric position with a more inclusive sense of a world 
that arises from the mutual, situated affordances of things and selves both human and 
non-human.  
What is the distribution of intention in this scenario? Intention is of interest here 
because it arises from our understanding of what there is to do; what acts are 
conceivable. (cf. Bernstein 1996) In Paul Grice’s account of speech acts (1975), 
intentionality plays a key role, since it is critical that the perceiver of a speech act 
understands not only the force of the action but also the fact that it was intended by the 
person who uttered it. We can say that Austin’s saying of « I do » affords marriage only 
if we believe that the person who utters the words really intends to do so, and that that 
intention, rather than just the words, is understood within the social and legal contexts 
in operation. This proposes a tension or force-field between the creative irruption of a 
speech act and the situation into which it intervenes and within which it has its effect. 
Peter Kivy asserts a similar tension within the social configuration of music when he 
states that «music is not a stimulus […]: it is an object of perception and cognition, 
which understanding opens up for appreciation» (Kivy 1990: 41). This proposes that 
conventions and creative agency are not enough to instantiate a speech or music act. His 
remark reminds us that, whatever the determinations of context,  the felicity  of music 
acts, and of speech acts, involves not only the intention of the person who makes the 
utterance, but also the intention of the person who hears it. Thus, in Jankélévitch’s 
account of the pianist performing, it is the listening that is the critical element: 
  
One doesn’t ‘listen to’ a pianist playing before his public […] in the same way that 
one ‘listens to’ a lecturer speaking to his audience5 (Jankélévitch 1961: 32, 
Jankélévitch’s emphasis, author’s translation) 
                                                             
5 On n'« écoute » pas un pianiste qui joue devant son public ou un chanteur qui chante devant ce même 
public comme on « écoute » un conférencier qui parle à ses auditeurs. 







3.2  Inter-subjective Co-creation 
I want to suggest here, as I implied at the end of Part 2 above, when I said «music - 
whatever that is», that music is not simply a perceptual flow or a structured set of 
sounding objects, ‘out there’ and available for perception and interpretation. It is rather 
a sonorous network of disparate components, unfolding in time, that afford listening i.e. 
an intentional act of co-creation. One could even say that music is open to what sound 
has to give it. This would figure music as the consequence of listening, in the presence 
of bodies, animate and inanimate, brought into being by a music act on the part of the 
listener, as well as on the part of the maker; that is: guided by two sets of intentions. 
This joint enterprise is set out by the Scottish Enlightenment philosopher, John Reid 
(1788): 
 
I call those operations social, which necessarily imply social intercourse with some 
other intelligent being who bears a part in them. A man may see, and hear, and 
remember, and judge, and reason; he may deliberate and form purposes, and 
execute them, without the intervention of any other intelligent being. They are 
solitary acts. But when he asks a question for information, when he testifies a fact, 
when he gives a command to his servant, when he makes a promise, or enters into 
a contract, these are social acts of mind, and can have no existence without the 
intervention of some other intelligent being, who acts a part in them. Between the 
operations of the mind, which, for want of a more proper name, I have called 
solitary, and those I have called social, there is this very remarkable distinction that, 
in the solitary, the expression of them by words, or any other sensible sign, is 
accidental. They may exist, and be complete, without being expressed, without 
being known to any other person. But, in the social operations, the expression is 
essential. They cannot exist without being expressed by words or signs, and known 
to the other party (Reid 1788: 330). 
 
In this reading, taking music to be an «expressed [...] sign», music appears as a ‘social 
operation’ that is cocreated, and co-intended by bodies in sympathy, making it an act of 
intersubjectivity that «enacts» its subjects. This would mean that there could be what I 
would call ‘reduced’ or partial musics. When John Cage says, in a late interview, that 
«finally I’d rather just listen to traffic» (Miller, Smacny 2012) he is proposing a music act 
where the only intentionality is that of the listener;  i.e. there is a sense in which listening 
makes music as a music act in its own right. 
 
In conclusion, I have tried to show how it is possible to think about music as acting, in 
the same way as Austin thinks about language as acting, and I have made a few basic 
suggestions concerning a range of possible music acts. These reveal some clear 
differences between music acts and speech acts,  proposing that the relationship 
between the two is not simply metaphorical. A speech act requires certain sorts of laws 
or social conventions to produce its effect. To make a bet, to marry, to prohibit, are all 
substantive arrangements of social power. Music also acts within social conventions that 
are set in place by similar social and political forces, but I have suggested ways in which 
music might be seen to engage contexts and conventions that are themselves 
instantiated musically.  These conventions may concern the formation of subjects, even 
in liminal spaces. As Claude Levi-Strauss (1964) and Phillipe Descola (2013) point out 
that the notions of ‘culture’ and ‘nature’ co-evolve with one another, perhaps music 
might also act within the conventions of this ‘nature’ alongside which ‘culture’ evolves. 
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